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Same-Sex Marriage in a Welcoming World:
Rights Consciousness of Heterosexuals
in Liberal Religious Institutions
Emily Kazyak
Department of Sociology and Program in Women’s and Gender Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln,
725 Oldfather Hall, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA; email ekazyak2@unl.edu

been reached through state legislatures votes (Vermont
and New Hampshire) as well as through state Supreme
Court decisions (Iowa, Massachusetts, and Connecticut). Other states offer alternative forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples, such as civil unions (New
Jersey) or domestic partnerships (Wisconsin). Still other
states have amended their state constitutions to ban
same-sex marriage through voter-approved ballot initiatives, including the ballot initiatives in 11 states during
the 2004 presidential election and the 2008 Proposition 8
initiative in California.
As these varied legal changes with regard to gay
marriage illustrate, decisions about gay marriage have
been reached at the federal and state levels and in legislative, judicial, and executive realms. Indeed, the
question of how legalization of gay marriage should
occur has been a focus in public discourse. Take, for
instance, the recent voter decision in Iowa to remove
three Supreme Court justices who were part of the decision to legalize gay marriage. The Iowa vote has been
applauded by anti-gay marriage organizations like
the National Organization for Marriage, whose president posits that judges wrongly “usurped the will of
the people and imposed gay marriage” (National Organization for Marriage, 2010). The executive director of a pro-gay marriage organization, One Iowa, asserts that the courts are “there to protect the minority
against the tyranny of the majority” (Sulzberger 2010).
What about people outside social movement organizations or courtrooms? How do they make sense of gay
marriage and the relationship between legal and social
change?

Abstract  
Previous research suggests that gays and lesbians not only
look to the law as an important site of social recognition but
also pursue strategies to legitimate their relationships outside of the law, such as having commitment ceremonies in religious institutions. While previous research suggests that homosexuality is a divisive issue within religious communities,
we know little about how heterosexual religious people understand same-sex marriage. I aim to fill this gap and analyze
the rights consciousness of heterosexual members in liberal religious denominations. Drawing on in-depth interviews, I examine how people make sense of the relationship between law
and social change. While all interviewees support same-sex
marriage, they express a contradictory understanding of how
it should become legal in the USA. I analyze how they reconcile this contradiction within the context of their religious
institutions.
Keywords: same-sex marriage, religion, legal consciousness,
rights, Unitarian Universalism, United Church of Christ

The issue of same-sex marriage has garnered national
attention in the USA within the last two decades. Although gay and lesbian couples took part in ceremonies
to mark their commitment long before this attention
(Chauncey, 1994; Lewin, 1998) and same-sex couples
first applied for marriage licenses in 1970 (Chauncey,
2004; Cott, 2000; Graf, 1999), events over the past
20 years catapulted the issue of same-sex marriage onto
the national cultural and political landscape. While the
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 federally defines marriage as between one man and one woman, at the state
level, laws vary tremendously. Some states issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, an outcome that has
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Employing a legal consciousness framework that focuses on how the law is understood by ordinary people
in everyday life (Ewick and Silbey, 1998), I analyze in this
article how heterosexuals make sense of gay marriage.
Since religion and morality have been a focus in discussions about same-sex marriages and much attention has
been given to conservative and evangelical Christian perspectives on same-sex marriage, the data presented here
come from in-depth interviews with members of two liberal religious denominations. Given that all of the interviewees support marriage rights for same-sex couples,
I do not focus on whether or not they support same-sex
marriage. Rather, I ask: What are the narratives they use
to describe what same-sex marriage means and how it
should become legal? I demonstrate how a contradiction
exists in their narratives about how same-sex marriage
should become legal. Religious progressives express an
understanding that legal change should and often does
happen prior to social change, and therefore, same-sex
marriage should be legal regardless of societal attitudes.
However, they also express an understanding that social
change should occur prior to legal change, and therefore,
same-sex marriage should and will become legal only after the majority of people support it. I also ask: How do
they reconcile this contradiction within their religious
context? As religious progressives, they value the ability for an individual to decide his or her own morals and
stress the importance of the democratic process. Furthermore, their experiences in congregations with welcoming
policies toward gays and lesbians inform their optimism
that the majority of people will support same-sex marriage in the future. Thus, while they support same-sex
marriage, they believe that it is appropriate for decisions
about it to be reached democratically and accept differing
opinions about it. As they are unsatisfied with the current
majority opinion with regard to same-sex marriage, yet
also are not interested in imposing their opinion on others, religious progressives believe that the majority opinion will eventually change. Before turning to these findings and discussion, I outline the theoretical frameworks
and the existing literature that ground this research and
detail the research methods and data on which this paper is based.

Silbey, 1998; Harrington and Yngvesson, 1990; McCann,
1994; Ygnvesson, 1993). In this way, rights are emblematic of communication, meaning-making, and social inclusion. Rights are a communal discourse that individuals draw on to make sense of who they are and what
they deserve and to convince others about how they
should be treated (Minow, 1987; Williams, 1987). Thus,
the contestation of the meaning of rights take place not
only in courtrooms or among those directly pursuing
social change, but also in everyday life (Ewick and Silbey, 1998; Merry, 1990; Sarat and Kearns, 1993). As research addresses the meanings of rights in everyday life,
the goal should not be only to outline people’s everyday understanding of the law, but also to analyze what
made those perceptions possible and the effects of such
perceptions (Silbey 2005). Scholars have pursued this
line of inquiry to analyze rights consciousness across a
range of topics, including disability (Engel and Munger,
2003), fatness (Kirkland, 2008), work (McCann, 1994),
and same-sex marriage (Harding, 2006, 2008; Hull, 2006).
Hull (2006) finds that the law is an important site for
many gays and lesbians and that the legal recognition
of marriage is desired not only for its practical benefits
but also for the perceived social and cultural legitimacy
of the law. She also argues that gay and lesbian couples
enact alternative forms of legality outside of official law
through acts such as having public rituals or ceremonies and using terms like “spouse” or “wife” to describe
their same-sex partners. She explains that couples often
turn to religious institutions when having a public ritual, and thus, “religion often functions as an alternative
to the state as a source of legality” (Hull, 2006, p. 652).
Given that many gays and lesbians look to religious institutions as site to enact legality, it is important to understand how heterosexual members in such religious
institutions understand this move and how they interpret same-sex marriage more broadly. Moreover, much
of legal consciousness scholarship often looks at how
people make sense of law as they think about pursing or
actively pursue their own rights claims. The study shifts
attention away from how individuals think about their
own rights to a focus on how people make sense of others’ rights claims, which is particularly important given
an understanding of rights as a communal discourse.

Literature Review

Religion, Politics, and Sexuality

Legal Consciousness

A number of scholars have analyzed the intersection of religion, politics, and sexuality in American
society (e.g., Davis and Robinson, 1996; Hunter, 1991;
Olson and Carroll, 1992; Wuthnow, 1988). Some argue that “the culture wars,” a “war” characterized
by divisions over religion and morality that translate
into the political sphere, is exaggerated and that the
liberal—conservative religious split does not translate neatly into a liberal–conservative political divide

Sociolegal studies articulate the need to analyze the
relationship between law, rights, and social context
(Galanter, 2006; Garth and Sterling, 1998). While debate
exists about the nature of that relationship and the extent to which rights matter (e.g., McCann, 1996; Rosenberg, 1996), many argue that rights, social context, and
consciousness are mutually constitutive (e.g., Ewick and
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(Davis and Robinson, 1996; Olson and Carroll, 1992).
However, nearly all scholars point to sexuality, specifically homosexuality, as a divisive issue within religious communities and as an issue around which
leaders and members mobilize within congregations
and in the political sphere (Cadge et al., 2007, 2008;
Cadge and Wildeman, 2008; Ellingon et al., 2001;
Moon, 2004; Stein, 2001).
In fact, religion often occupies a central focus in explaining opposition to same-sex marriage. Consider,
for instance, the discussions following the 2004 presidential election that linked the passage of constitutional amendments that ban same-sex marriage in
eleven states with voters’ “moral values.” Analyses
indicate that, in fact, those who indicated that moral
values are an important priority are more likely to be
opposed to same-sex marriage (Olson et al. 2006). Research has focused on why and how conservative and
evangelical Christians mobilize around anti-gay politics (Irvine, 2005; Linneman, 2004). Among the rhetoric that anti-gay organizations use in their activism include language such as “homosexual activists” and
“liberal courts” (Irvine, 2005, p. 10). Linneman (2004)
illustrates how the rise in anti-gay sentiment among
conservative Christians stems from the fact that this
population sees themselves as facing an environment
that is increasing hostile. Specifically, they understand
progress for gays and lesbians to be linked to their own
marginalization.
The bulk of this literature analyzes Evangelical or
Mainline Protestant denominations and focuses on the
current struggles congregations face when dealing with
homosexuality. This focus reflects a limitation, particularly given that there is variation within religious traditions with respect to views on same-sex sexuality and
not all religious traditions oppose same-sex marriage or
mobilize around anti-gay activism. Churches that emphasize social justice can often provide a context to advocate for social change and rights for sexual minorities due to their unique position outside of legal and
state realms (Howe, 2007). Furthermore, many denominations have adopted official policies welcoming gays
and lesbians for decades and have supported same-sex
marriage, including the United Church of Christ and the
Unitarian Universalist Association,1 but there has been
little scholarly attention paid to such denominations.
Moreover, we know relatively little about how religious
people make sense of same-sex marriage. By analyzing
the rights consciousness of heterosexual members of liberal religious congregations, this article attempts to fill
these gaps.
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Gay and Lesbian Sexuality in a Post-Closet World
That debates about same-sex marriage are occurring
in American politics reflects an increasing consciousness
in the public imagination about gays and lesbians (Gamson, 1998; Walters, 2001). Seidman (2002) terms this moment a “post-closet” one insofar as gays and lesbians are
no longer living double lives or denying their sexuality.
Rather, gay and lesbians are accepting their sexual identity and integrating it into the rest of their social lives. Seidman also draw attention to the fact that the normalization process around gay and lesbian identity is true
only for some gays and lesbians—namely, those who are
“gender conventional, well adjusted, and integrated into
mainstream society; she is committed to home, family, career and nation” (p. 14). Furthermore, Seidman notes that
the transformation of gay and lesbian life is incomplete—
in interpersonal, cultural, and institutional realms—and
highlights contradictions in the “post-closet” life. Despite being able to live beyond the closet, gays and lesbians also live in a world of “heterosexual domination”—in
where “heterosexuals enjoy a privileged, superior social
status that is secured by the state, social institutions, and
popular culture” (Seidman, 2002, p. 6).
One of the ways that heterosexuality is privileged at
the state level is reflected in the fact that the model citizen is implicitly defined as heterosexual (Richardson,
1998). There is considerable debate about the desirability
and the consequences of efforts to contest this definition
of citizenship by advocating for same-sex marriage (e.g.
Ettelbrick, 1997; Eskridge, 1996; Stoddard, 1997; Warner,
1999). Access to equal citizenship is predicated on assertions that gays and lesbians are good, normal, and respectable and have relationships that mirror heterosexual
ones (Richardson, 2004). Similarly, access to equal citizenship maintains the public/private binary insofar as the
respectable gay and lesbian in the public sphere is desexualized (Richardson, 2004; Warner, 1999). In effect, the
notion of the public citizen as an “abstract, disembodied”
individual (Lister 1997, p. 70) is not challenged in efforts
to legally recognize same-sex marriage.
That the Unitarian Universalist (UU) and United
Church of Christ (UCC) congregations studied in this
research, which have policies that welcome gays and
lesbians, and the fact that same-sex couples do not have
the right to marry highlight the contradictory moment
of beyond the closet life. How then do heterosexuals
who support same-sex marriage, but are living in a context where that right is not conferred to gays and lesbians make sense of the meaning of rights and the relationship between social and legal change?

1. The UU and the UCC denominations adopted the “welcoming” and “open and affirming” policies toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals at the
national level in 1989 and 1985, respectively. These denominations have also passed resolutions in support of the right for same-sex couples to
marry (Unitarian Universalist Association, 1996; United Church of Christ, 2005a).
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Method
The data analyzed in this article come from 19 indepth interviews that I conducted with heterosexual members of a UU and a UCC congregation located
in two mid-size cities in the Midwest between May
and August of 2005. The UCC congregation adopted
the “open and affirming” policy in 1989 and was one
of the first churches in the state to have such a policy.
The UU congregation adopted the “welcoming” policy
in 1992. Ministers of both congregations perform commitment ceremonies and religious marriage ceremonies
for same-sex couples. In addition to similar stances on
gay and lesbian issues, both the UU and the UCC describe themselves as liberal or progressive denominations (Unitarian Universalist Association, 2005a; United
Church of Christ, 2005b). Unitarian Universalism as is a
non-creedal religion; rather than a creed, there are seven
principles the denomination promotes, including (1)
the inherent worth and dignity of every person, (2) justice, equity, and compassion in human relation, (3) acceptance of one another and encouragement to spiritual
growth in our congregation, (4) a free and responsible
search for truth and meaning, (5) the right of conscience
and the use of the democratic process within our congregations and in society at large, (6) the goal of world
community with peace, liberty, and justice for all, and
(7) respect for the interdependent web of all existence
of which we are a part (Unitarian Universalist Association 2005b). UCC is a Christian denomination, though
from its start “affirmed the ideal that Christians did not
always have to agree to live together in communion”
(United Church of Christ, 2005b). This openness across
congregations could be what the minister at the congregation where I interviewed was referring to when stating that UCCs are understood by some as “Unitarian
Universalists Considering Christ.” Of course, this stance
need not be a reflection of the UCC denomination as a
whole, nor all UCC congregations,2 but is important for
the project at hand insofar as I analyze UCC alongside
UU members.
To recruit participants, I announced my project during a service (at the United Church of Christ congregation) and placed an announcement in newsletters and
service programs (at the Unitarian Universalist congregation). The announcements requested individuals
who were members of the congregation and were willing to talk about their congregation’s open and affirming or welcoming policy and their thoughts about political and social activism and change with regard to gays
and lesbians. In this article, I focus on the 19 interviews
I conducted with heterosexual-identified members of
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the congregations. The majority of these participants
(13) were recruited from the UU congregation, and six
were recruited from the UCC congregation. The sample includes 12 women and seven men who range in age
from 40 to 87, with the average age being 58. The racial
makeup of the sample is overwhelmingly white, with
only one participant who described herself as Mestizo.
The interviews were semi-structured and followed an
interview schedule that included questions about experiences in the congregation, the welcoming or open and
affirming policy, and social and political action, including the anti-same-sex marriage ballot initiative. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. I began the analysis by reading through each transcript and
taking notes on the themes that were most interesting.
Some of the topics that emerged in this process, which
Emerson et al. (1995) refer to as “open coding,” include
that participants repeatedly characterized sexuality as a
private, irrelevant attribute and that they placed importance on people’s ability to determine their own truth
and values. I then further coded within the topics identified in open coding, doing “focused coding” (Emerson et al., 1995). For instance, one theme that emerged
from the focused coding within the topic of “importance
of determining own truth” is that interviewees made
clear distinctions between their denominations and the
religious right. After coding the interview data, I wrote
analytic memos that linked themes, which were then
developed into the results below. This process that entailed reading each transcript, categorizing line-by-line
once initial codes were generated, and returning to the
coded data while writing, allowed for a close examination of the data. It allowed me to generate themes based
on “member’s meanings” and capture the understandings about same-sex marriage put forth by interviewees.
At the same time, the codes produced and the themes
delineated here reflect my research interests and are but
some of the many that could have been generated (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 151). The quotes used are edited for
the sake of clarity, and pseudonyms are used for each
participant.
Findings
Understanding of Rights
According to members of liberal religious communities, there are two competing notions of what rights
are: Rights are understood both as a reflection of majority opinion and as counter-majoritarian. The narratives that the interviewees used when talking about the

2. Indeed, the official denominations stance is not one of “considering” Christ but of belief: “We believe in the triune God: Creator, resurrected
Christ, the sole Head of the church, and the Holy Spirit, who guides and brings about the creative and redemptive work of God in the world”
(United Church of Christ, 2005c).
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right of marriage for same-sex couples reveal a tension
about what that right would signify. In one understanding, legal recognition of same-sex marriage would be a
reflection of societal acceptance; in another, it would be
a reflection of a transcendence of contemporary anti-gay
societal norms. In other words, while all interviewees
were in support of same-sex marriage, their narratives
revealed contradictory understandings about the relationship between social and legal change. Which change
should come first? Does (and should) social change
happen prior to legal change? Or does (and should) legal change spur changes in the social realm? Consistent
with other legal consciousness scholarship (Ewick and
Silbey, 1998), interviewees did not express only one understanding about law and social change.
Majority Opinion Versus Counter-Majoritarian
When discussing same-sex marriage, all of the interviewees talked about the public’s opinions and values.
When asked about what they thought would happen in
the USA with regards to same-sex marriage, only two
people mentioned the Supreme Court, while the others
all discussed the majority and its role in democratically
deciding the future of the issue.3 Thus, according to
one understanding, rights are a reflection of the majority’s morals and opinions, as expressed through a democratic vote. Brad clearly articulates a belief that the right
of marriage for same-sex couples should be decided in
such a fashion. Speaking of same-sex marriage, he said
that he is “willing to let that be decided by the process
that we have in place…I’d go with what the voters say
on that.” While he “would vote to have gay marriage,”
he also supports democratically deciding whether samesex couples should have the right to marry. Likewise,
Melissa described that “[the status of gay marriage in
the United States] unfortunately is not going to change
because there are too many people whose very sincere beliefs are quite different from mine…in a democracy, that makes a big difference [because] the majority does rule.” Bob also stressed the importance of the
democratic process and stated that the country “needs
to move” in a direction of valuing that process more:
This country was founded on the democratic
process that grows out of an ideology that says
people have a right to their point of view and
that point of view needs to be widely shared
and widely discussed. In the democratic process, we eventually take a position. I do not always get what I want, but it is the process that
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is more important. It is more important that
we follow that democratic process, even if that
may mean that some people may not get what
they want.
These quotes underscore the understanding that the
public does and should have a role in deciding which
groups are deserving of rights and which groups are
not. While these three interviewees, like all the participants, think that same-sex couples should be able to legally marry, they also express an understanding that it
is important to uphold the opinions of the majority.
In talking about those against same-sex marriage, the
majority of people blamed evangelical religious beliefs,
ignorance, and lack of experience with gay people. Importantly, however, some pointed to changes in the legal landscape. For instance, Megan made sense of the
passage of state amendments in 2004 that defined marriage as between one man and one woman as being a
reaction to marriages performed in San Francisco. She
says: “I think what made that happen was the…kinda
in your face [of the San Francisco events]…I think
that’s how people took it…I think there was a backlash.” Christine also commented that the issue of marriage for same-sex couples was pushed “too fast.” In her
view, gays and lesbians “should have stuck with [civil
unions]…so that at least you had all the rights of a married couple…before you got into this next thing of marriage, which carries with it so much…baggage.” These
narratives reveal how people grapple with the question
of legal and social change. They illustrate a concern with
same-sex couples having the right to marry “too fast,”
or before there is societal change and a majority that
supports same-sex marriage.
However, interviewees also articulated the understanding that rights are counter-majoritarian. Rather
than being reflective of the majority’s opinion, rights
are understood to transcend contemporary attitudes.
This transcendence was articulated in both legalistic and
moral terms. Two people explicitly referenced the Supreme Court and the US Constitution when asked about
what they thought would happen in the country in regards to same-sex marriage. Jeff for instance said:
I think hopefully the right Supreme Court justices will get a hold of this and see that there
really isn’t a place for the state in regulating
these relationships. I think judges will have to
make the right decision.
Jeff explained that if same-sex marriage is “up to
the populace, I don’t think we’re gonna go very far.”

3. I did not ask specifically about the role of the Supreme Court. However, following Engel and Munger (2003), my interest is in the narratives people draw on to make sense of the law. Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court was not part of most people’s narratives about gay marriage is
telling, even though the Supreme Court might have been more salient in their narratives had I asked specifically about its role. In this way, the
narratives presented in this section reflect people’s understandings both of what would and should happen with regard to gay marriage.
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Heather similarly evoked a legalistic counter-majoritarian view of rights when she said “our Constitution believes we have rights.”
The view that rights exist to counter “the populace”
was also expressed in moralistic terms. Participants
understood rights to be a reflection of moral truth that
transcends contemporary attitudes. This conceptualization of rights was most salient when interviewees
made “like race” arguments (Halley, 2000). The people I interviewed drew parallels between the experiences of gays and lesbians and African Americans as
well as between same-sex marriage and interracial
marriage. When explaining why she is “completely in
favor of gay marriage,” Melissa said “it means dignity
and not being separated and treated differently. Same
with racism; why treat someone differently because of
their race? I see it as parallel.” Shirley also analogized
to race when talking about same-sex marriage. She recounted a personal exchange where someone she was
talking with made a comment that gay groups were
pushing the issue too fast. She explained: “I said [to
the person making the comment], you sound like people talking about Blacks when they were going to civil
rights [who said] ‘just stay there under the bamboo
tree and eat your watermelon, it’s not time.’ Come on.
When is the time?” Shirley’s story suggests an understanding that same-sex marriage should exist regardless of how the populace thinks. Christine compared
her current support for same-sex marriage to when
“people took a stand in support of marriage between
black and white 40 years ago.” Deborah echoed this
understanding when she says “if people want to get
married, let them get married…It shouldn’t make any
difference whether they’re gay or lesbians or men or
women or black or white.” In these narratives, the right
for same-sex couples to marry comes from a sense of
equality and morality. Thus, although drawing on different sources, either legalistic or moralistic, interviewees articulated the understanding that rights are counter-majoritarian. In these narratives, legal change with
regard to granting rights to a minority should happen
regardless of majority opinion.
Material and Social Benefits
Interviewees articulated an understanding that the
right of marriage for same-sex couples would carry
both material benefits and social benefits. For some,
the material benefits afforded to spouses, such as access to healthcare or pensions, were significant aspects
of marriage. Megan expressed: “I don’t think marriage
is sacred. I think marriage is a civil agreement between
two people.” Jeff likewise articulated the importance
for same-sex couples to be able to enter into marriage
because “when you get into property and economic
means, there needs to be some clarity of the agreement.”
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He explained that being married means that the state
recognizes that relationship and can protect the parties involved in the event of divorce, through things
like spousal and child support. For this reason, Jeff
thinks that same-sex marriage should be legal. In addition, Brad said: “I’m a little cynical about issues of principle…and I think what marriage of same-sex people is
all about really has to do with the economic attributes
of a marriage.” While not agreeing that material or economic benefits were the only important aspect of marriage, others did mention things like spouses having access to healthcare as an important reason why same-sex
marriage should be legally recognized.
Additionally, people discussed social benefits that accompanied marriage. While Megan viewed marriage as
a civil agreement that affords certain economic benefits,
she also addressed the following reason when explaining her support of same-sex marriage: “it makes perfect sense if people love each other and are in a relationship, marriage is what is accepted in our community as
the way you show that.” Given the fact that marriage affords couples recognition from society, Megan thinks
gay and lesbian couples should be able to marry. Likewise, Charles commented: “when you get a marriage license from a county clerk, that is a symbolic acknowledgment that society accepts what you’re proposing to
do. So I think it’s an important symbol of acceptance in
society.” These quotes underscore the understanding
that the right of marriage entails not only economic benefits but also the social benefits of being recognized by
others in your community as a legitimate, loving, committed couple.
Like gays and lesbians (Hull, 2006), heterosexuals in “post-closet” institutional contexts such as UCC
or UU congregations do still imagine rights as being
about societal acceptance and as being important sites
where people’s identities and lives are validated, despite being part of congregations that recognize samesex marriages. However, their narratives reveal a tension between same-sex couples being able to announce
their love and commitment and society recognizing that declaration. In other words, as the following
quote from Charles illustrates, it is precisely because
he understands rights to symbolize societal acceptance
that he wavers about the importance of gays and lesbians having the right to marry, even though he himself thinks they should. Talking about gay couples
getting married, Charles says: “There’s a subtle distinction between being able to declare it and having
the rest of society recognize it. To me, the right to declare it without fear or persecution is a much more important thing than having society recognize it.” While
Charles supports same-sex marriage, he also maintains
a view that it would mean societal acceptance, something he is more hesitant to embrace as a goal worthy
of achieving.
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The narratives offered by Charles and other interviewees highlight the following contradiction about
the relationship between social and legal change. According to one understanding, social change should
occur prior to any legal change: Same-sex couples
should and will have the right to marry after the majority of people accept and support that right. However, at the same time, their narratives also reveal
an understanding that legal change should and often does happen prior to change in societal attitudes:
Same-sex couples should and will have the right to
marry regardless (and before) of societal attitudes.
Therefore, how do people justify this apparent contradiction in their understanding about same-sex marriage? Below, I address how these reconciliations happen within the institutional and social context of their
religious congregations.
Reconciling Contradictions
Religious Values in Political Life and the Freedom to Decide
When asked about the role they thought religious beliefs or values should play in political life, interviewees
stressed the importance of the separation of church and
state and also expressed frustration about politicians
trying to use religion to garner support. However, all
but one person thought an individual’s religious beliefs
or values should play a role in how they vote. In other
words, respondents want religious and moral values
part of people’s decisions in the political realm. Cindie
explained that “all the decisions I make, I make knowing what my faith belief is, so I do think it’s very important.” Heather agreed that “I think if we stand for
justice and if we stand for peace that has to carry into
everything we do, whether it’s political or work related
or how we spend our time or volunteering or spending money.” Jeff also articulated this belief that “voting
consistent with ones’ religious beliefs, say, pro-choice
or not, is legitimate.” Melissa also thinks that religious
beliefs affecting political participation is inevitable and
“in many ways a positive.” Andrea was the only person
who thought individuals should not consider their religious beliefs when voting or making political decisions
but should rather “transcend” them “in order to make
sure society takes the course that is good for everybody.” However, the majority of participants stressed
the importance of individuals participating in political
life in such a way that connects with their religious beliefs or values.
In addition, interviewees stressed that individuals
must have the freedom to decide their own truth and
values, even if it fundamentally disagrees with their
own position. This position is informed by both their religious beliefs and identity and their desire to distance
themselves from religious conservatives. When talk-
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ing about the importance of recognizing the diversity
of opinions and granting others the freedom to decide
what is true for them, the Unitarian Universalists interviewees drew on the UU principle of “free and responsible search for truth and meaning.” George explained
that UUs “believe in individual freedom and in people
making up their own minds.” United Church of Christ
participants were more likely to reference their understanding of the Bible or Jesus when talking about the
belief that everyone should have the freedom to make
their own decisions and that there is no one truth. For
instance, Cindie explained that: “my personal philosophy is that no where in the Bible do I have instructions
to judge anyone. What you do here on earth, you’re going to deal with God on later. It’s not my position to tell
anybody they’re right or wrong on anything they do.
It’s that—judge not lest ye be judged.” Although they
drew on different sources to explain why, members of
both religious groups were adamant that individuals
should have the freedom to do and believe what they
think is right.
The hesitancy to offer an absolute judgment of other’s actions or beliefs was also informed by a desire
to distance themselves from religious conservatives,
who were often described as being a part of the “religious right.” The following example from Charles
most clearly underscores this theme. He explained
that he is “troubled” by the religious right because of
“their claim to have the one and only right answer,”
not because they are “a group of people with a particular point of view who are choosing to act collectively.”
He further explained that “I don’t think that religious
groups should be attempting to impose or proclaiming that they have the corner on truth. So I would not
advocate organizing Unitarians to say, no we have the
right answer.” He thinks the claim to absolute truth is
wrong, whether that be from the religious right or from
Unitarian Universalists. While Charles thinks religious
groups should be able to say “these are the ideals that
we live by and we invite you to join our community
and live by our values,” nothing further should occur
if a person responds with “no thank you, I have my
own values.” He says at that point, each side “should
accept the right of the other to exist and have rights
and opportunities in society.” Charles is committed to
a world where people with differing opinions co-exist
and do not impinge on each other’s rights and opportunities. He idealizes a fair society and a society with
multiple truths and values. His quotes underscore the
importance that interviewees place on both allowing
an individual the freedom to decide her own values as
well as on disavowing any claim to have an absolute
truth.
Since interviewees upheld individual freedom, they
often not only acknowledged but also legitimated beliefs that fundamentally opposed their own. For in-
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stance, when talking about people who oppose samesex marriage and are uncomfortable with gay people,
Melissa responded with the following: “Well, they believe it’s wrong. Just the same way I don’t want to have
war, [gay marriage] is the equivalent to them. They simply believe that there’s a negative effect, the same way I
think killing and fostering violence has a negative effect.
I think they’re not necessarily hateful. I think their expression, to me is hateful, but I think they simply have a
conviction that [gay marriage] is destructive, [the] same
way I see war as destructive.” Melissa certainly does not
agree with the belief that being gay is wrong nor that
same-sex marriage will be destructive, but in this quote,
she grants those beliefs the same legitimacy as her belief that war is destructive. Similarly, Christine asserted
that “there are some people who are totally uncomfortable with homosexuality. They cannot give a logical reason, they just are uncomfortable and cannot be accepting. And I don’t know what you do about that, nothing!
You can’t legislate how somebody feels, and, it would
be folly to try.” Christine’s quote suggests that it would
be a folly (and ineffective) for legal changes to precede
social changes with regard to attitudes toward homosexuality and same-sex marriage.
In this way, her quote, along with the others presented in this section, demonstrates how interviewees
reconcile the contradictory understanding about samesex marriage within the context of their religious institutions. The majoritarian view of rights is strengthened
by the belief that individuals should have the freedom
to decide their own values and the ability to demonstrate those values through voting. Discrediting the
opinions of those who are anti-gay marriage would be
akin to claiming only one truth, which religious progressives see as the problematic territory of religious
conservatives. Therefore, while participants support the
right for same-sex couples to marry, the meanings they
make within their institutional religious context provide justifications for the understanding that rights do
and should reflect the majority’s opinion. Thus, it would
be unsatisfactory for same-sex marriage to become legal
when the majority of people oppose same-sex marriage.
Of course, it would also be unsatisfactory if same-sex
marriage never became legal. Interviewees are optimistic that change in opinions about same-sex marriage will
happen through heterosexuals having more interactions
with gays and lesbians, which will usher in a change in
the legal realm. Again, the context of their religious institution, particularly its policy toward gays and lesbians, informs this optimism.
Changing Opinions About Same-Sex Marriage
All but one participant understood that personal experience, meaning daily interactions as well as watching television with gay characters, is an important way
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that opinions about same-sex marriage would change.
For instance, George explained that “subtle day-today exchanges that people have” is mostly how personal beliefs about gay people and same-sex marriage
shift. Positing how such a shift might occur, he said:
“through encountering somebody and working with
them…and they discover eight months later that he’s
gay. [They think], well, I like him, he’s wonderful, so
maybe being gay is not what I thought it was.” Likewise, Katie thinks that those opposed to homosexuality “need to have relationships with people and grow to
like them and then find out that they’re gay.” Thus, interviewees believe that experiences with gays and lesbians will lead to a progressive stance of being pro-gay
and pro-same-sex marriage. They see their congregations as providing a space for such experiences to occur insofar as their congregations have a welcoming or
open and affirming policy.
Indeed, participants understood their welcoming or
open and affirming policy to reflect a progressive stance
on sexuality. Katie thinks “our church is certainly more
open than a lot of churches about [sexuality].” Dan also
assigns Unitarian Universalism not only a progressive
quality but also the responsibility to bring about change.
He says that UUs are supposed to “bring people out of
the dark ages.” In talking about the UCC congregation’s
history being involved in welcoming people regardless
of race or sexuality, Lynette says “I feel good about the
things that this congregation is doing and always has
done.” However, their descriptions of what it means for
heterosexuals to have experiences with gays and lesbians and of what their congregational policy means reveals an understanding that sexuality is an irrelevant,
private, and unimportant characteristic. To notice or
comment on one’s sexuality is bad, and linking sexuality to sex is even worse.
According to the majority of interviewees, their congregation’s policy means that sexuality does not matter
and is a secondary characteristic. Talking about someone’s sexuality, Bob explained that: “I don’t really care
and it basically doesn’t make any difference to me. I
don’t consciously give it any thought.” Lynette also described how she is open and affirming toward gays and
lesbians in her congregation in the following way: “I
don’t view them differently, treat them differently, or
respond to them in any different manner.” She goes on
to give the example that “if somebody new has started
coming and someone asks, ‘are they gay?’ I’ll say, ‘I
don’t know, it doesn’t matter.’” In these quotes, not caring about someone’s sexuality equates to perhaps not
even thinking it is important to know about it. This indifference about one’s sexuality extends beyond the
congregations as well. Rachel, for instance, asserted that
“I have a lot of friends who are of a different orientation
from me. I don’t look at them that way. They’re just my
friends. I could care less who they go home with.” Like-
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wise, a story retold by Melissa underscores the understanding that to talk about someone’s sexuality, or even
to give it any thought, is bad. When I asked if she had
ever heard a group of middle schoolers to whom she
had taught religious education say anything homophobic, she shared the following story about hearing them
talk about someone who won a local competition. She
explained:
They were telling me which one won and his
sexuality came up. I remember somebody
said ‘he’s gay’ and then somebody else said
‘no he’s bi[sexual].’ And I didn’t say it, but I
[thought] my God, this kid’s lost all privacy of
his sexuality because he won this contest. So it
was a very accepting, even though it was gossip basically, there was a very accepting attitude as well. But still, I found that interesting
that it was a topic of conversation…I mean,
who cares about his sexuality? I think he deserves to not have that be the thing that comes
up when people are talking about his winning. I just don’t think that anybody needs to
have their sexuality as a topic of others’ conversation. Why make that a topic? Especially
when you’re not judging it negatively. It was
almost like a sensationalist thing.
According to Melissa, even though the students were
not saying anything negative about the winner’s sexuality nor were making fun of him, but were rather mentioning it as one descriptor of who he was, she thinks
they were out of bounds. For her, any discussion of
someone’s sexuality is sensationalist because no one
should care about it.
The story retold by Melissa resonates with the how
interviewees talked about the ideal way that attitudes
towards same-sex marriage would change. People who
are anti-same-sex marriage need to interact with gays
and lesbians so they can realize that, as George put it,
“being gay is not what I thought it was.” However, in
the ideal interaction, sexuality remains unacknowledged, so as to foster the ability for someone who is homophobic to like someone is who gay before knowing
about their sexuality. Across all these stories, acknowledging someone’s sexuality (too soon or in some cases,
ever) in interpersonal interactions is negative, as sexuality should be an irrelevant characteristic. Interviewees are optimistic that such experiences will lead to a
more accepting stance on same-sex marriage. In fact,
they reconcile the tension in how they think social and
legal change should be related by relying on this optimistic view that societal attitudes will change through
interpersonal interactions. Not satisfied with the current majority opinion with regard to same-sex marriage, and also not interested in imposing their opinion
on others, people justify this tension by pointing to a
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belief that the majority opinion will eventually change.
They see the existence of their congregation’s policies
toward gays and lesbians as one thing that might help
facilitate such change.
Discussion and Conclusion
Building on past research that has analyzed how gay
and lesbians interpret the right of marriage (Harding,
2006, 2008; Hull, 2006) and how religious communities
have struggled with and responded to homosexuality
(Cadge et al., 2007, 2008; Cadge and Wildeman, 2008; Ellingon et al., 2001; Moon, 2004; Stein, 2001), this research
asks how heterosexual in liberal religious congregations
understand the right of marriage for same-sex couples.
Given the small sample and recruitment techniques,
these findings are not meant to be representative or generalizable. Rather, the strength of this method is in the
fact that it provides an opportunity to highlight and analyze the nuanced, contradictory narratives people have
about law and social change. The data presented above
underscore the competing way that rights are understood: Rights for citizens are understood to be both a reflection and transcendence of the majority’s opinions.
While respondents support same-sex marriage, they
also support, perhaps more adamantly, an individual’s
freedom to decide his or her own truth. Participants also
want religious and moral values part of people’s decisions in the political realm. These findings suggest that
the tension between majoritarian and counter-majoritarian view of rights is only augmented given the importance placed on an individual’s freedom to both decide and act based on his or her own truth. Participants
think that same-sex couples should have access to marriage, yet their narratives reflect a hesitancy to claim to
have an absolute truth or to force their values or beliefs
on anyone else, whether those beliefs are about war or
same-sex marriage. Doing so would mean participating in tactics they associate with religious conservatives
and find unacceptable. While they view themselves as
having a more progressive and enlightened stance on
same-sex marriage, their understandings reflect a fine
line between advocating for same-sex marriage and going too far in forcing other’s into agreement on the issue. Rather, they hope that the majority opinions about
same-sex marriage will change as more heterosexuals
have personal experiences with gays and lesbians.
It is important to address the timing of my study.
All of these interviews were conducted in a state whose
voters 6 months earlier had approved a ballot initiative
that changed the state Constitution with the following
amendment: “To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage
shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or
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similar union for any purpose.” This recent passage no
doubt shaped the understandings that people articulated
in the interview. As interviewees discussed their understandings about rights and the extent to which they are
counter-majoritarian, they were doing so within a context
where the majority of people had just approved a ban on
the state recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples.
Had I conducted the interviews at a different time, participants might have addressed different court cases, for
instance. However, their conflicted understanding about
law and social change and the way they reconcile it provide some insights into how they might respond to the
changes in the legal landscape that have since occurred
since the time of the interviews.
The findings presented in this article are instructive
for thinking about the future of same-sex marriage in
the USA and the role that religious progressive might
play in advocating for it. By focusing attention on two
denominations that support same-sex marriage, this article serves as a reminder that being religious need not
be synonymous with being against same-sex marriage
or gay rights. In fact, in her research on the Metropolitan
Community Church, Howe (2007) argues that churches
might be better situated to advocate for gay rights than
other organizations that are seen as advocacy-orientated. The religious progressives in this study want
morals and religious beliefs to be a part of public policy
discourse, including discussions about same-sex marriage. Many of them also drew on ideas about morality
they thought should transcend contemporary anti-gay
attitudes in explaining their support for same-sex marriage, thus signaling one potential avenue for bringing
their “moral values” into public debates about samesex marriage. Future research could assess whether religious progressives assert similar explanations in public
forums and how effective such assertions are vis-à-vis
other religious people’s perspectives.
This is not to suggest that the understandings of
same-sex marriage among religious progressives, including the ones presented in this article, are not without problems. The findings presented here illustrate
some of the potential issues that might arise for progressive religious organizations advocating for same-sex
marriage. One of the barriers is the desire for progressive religious individuals to distance themselves from
those they see as part of the religious right who claim
absolute truth with regard to their stance on homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Fostering inter-faith dialogues might be one potential solution that would allow
multiple religious perspectives on same-sex marriage to
be heard. Having multiple perspectives might alleviate
religious progressives’ fear of imposing their opinion on
others without allowing for dialogue.
Another potential limitation indicated by these findings is the understandings of sexuality offered by interviewees. While they support same-sex marriage and
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their congregation’s welcoming policy toward gays
and lesbians, they also see sexuality as something that
should be kept in the private realm. Not only should
sexuality be in the private realm, but it should also be
unrecognized even there, as it is an irrelevant characteristic. By situating sexual identity as private, they conflate a public acknowledgement of gay or lesbian sexual identity with being anti-gay. Rather than use a logic
of pain when talking about gays and lesbians (Moon,
2004), these liberal religious members use a logic that
empties sexuality from having any meaning. Their narratives suggest a difference between heterosexuals
and gays and lesbians that has implications for advocacy efforts. While some gays and lesbians are increasingly seeking public recognition of their relationships
(and by extension, their sexuality) (Lewin, 1998; Hull,
2006), some progressive heterosexuals maintain that
sexuality should be not thought or talked about. Thus,
the understanding that being progressive means treating sexuality as irrelevant or unacknowledged seems to
be contrary to the recognition that some gays and lesbians desire. Furthermore, the findings presented here
also suggest a belief that the private sphere is seen as
the proper site for sexual minorities to challenge public legal status. Public demonstrations are seen as leading to backlash, too “in your face,” and not appropriate
route given the emphasis on interpersonal interactions
as the way to change attitudes. In this way, their narratives uphold a normative ideal of citizenship (Lister,
1997; Richardson, 2004; Warner, 1999).
I argue that such an understanding of sexuality underscores the contradictory and incomplete inclusion
of sexual minorities in the “post-closest” contemporary
moment (Seidman, 2002). In other words, the understanding of sexuality offered by these religious progressives is not necessarily unique to them. It does, however, have unique implications for thinking about how
allies make sense of and advocate for same-sex marriage. It indicates that when talking about the lives of
gays and lesbians (their friends, members of their religious community), supporters of same-sex marriage often struggle to find a language to talk about how and
why sexuality might matter in those lives. In other
words, can there be a way to both express support for
same-sex marriage and also recognize how sexuality
might in fact be very meaningful for interpersonal interactions and those individuals seeking rights? While
Hull (2006) posits the possibility that engaging with the
issue of same-sex marriage on moral terms and using
personal stories to humanize the impact of the lack of
recognition might help bolster supporters’ claims, these
findings suggest that in addition to moral terms, there
might need to be cultural terms that allow for a richer
account of gay and lesbian identity and life. Moreover,
this research illustrates a tension in post-closet world for
heterosexuals as they negotiate how to both welcome
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and accept gays and lesbians while simultaneously acknowledge their sexuality. Accordingly, one implication
of this research for progressive religious organizations
is the need to continue dialogue about what a welcoming or open and affirming policy might mean for samesex marriage advocacy.
Furthermore, this research highlights a component
that contributes to ambivalence about same-sex marriage, even from people who support it. It shows that
some heterosexual allies are ambivalent, though supportive, because of a concern about legal changes happening prior to the majority of people accepting
same-sex marriage. Just as past research has shown contradictions among conservative Christians with regard to
how they view same-sex sexual relations and gay rights
(Linneman, 2004), or variation among religious individuals on specific gay right issues (Besen and Zicklin, 2007),
this research shows contradictions among progressive
religious people. While Hull (2001) found that supporters of same-sex marriage were likely to minimize the link
between law and culture, the supporters in this study
were very explicit about this link. In fact, it is precisely
because of the tension in how rights are understood that
creates ambivalence about same-sex couples having the
right to marry prior to the majority of the public accepting it. Even though the people I interviewed support
same-sex marriage, they also maintain a view that rights
are and should be granted by the majority. Listening to
these narratives indicates the need to be mindful about
the ambivalence when advocating for same-sex marriage
and discussing chances that have occurred with regard
to same-sex marriage. Future research could analyze the
question of when a counter-majoritarian view of rights
is most effectively supported. For instance, given that
current public support is much higher than it was when
these interviews were conducted (Langer, 2011) and that
some states have made same-sex marriage legal through
legislative action, do allies understand same-sex marriage differently?
Finally, a related implication of this research is that
it indicates that this is a fraught moment when talking
about law’s importance for sexual minorities—particularly around marriage. How to talk about law’s importance in the daily everyday lives of sexual minorities
presents a predicament. On the one hand, progressive
religious allies see their congregations as places that accept gays and lesbians. This is important insofar as people share similar views to Charles, who indicated that
he was more concerned with gays and lesbians being
able to declare their love, ostensibly something they are
able to do via being able to have a commitment ceremony, than have it recognized by society, via being able
to get a marriage license. As gays and lesbians continue
to enact legality outside of the law (Hull, 2006) and heterosexual allies support this by similar actions (e.g., going to commitment ceremonies, using “wife” or “son
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in-law” regardless of the legal status of marriage), how
might there be a simultaneous advocacy for the importance of the law? In a similar vein, since religious progressives articulate their support for marriage by drawing on moral terms as well as by pointing to the material
and social benefits of marriage, this research suggest
that perhaps religious progressives might be less likely
to recognize the psychological harm gays and lesbians
experience as a result of not having access to marriage
(Herdt and Kertzner, 2006). In other words, do religious progressives assume that any psychological harm
is countered by having accepting spaces such as their
congregations within which to celebrate their commitment? Future work could address this question. Moreover, since this research highlights diversity of opinions
among religious people and the contradictions in surrounding ideas about the ideal relationship between the
law and social changes, it indicates an important area
that future work should continue to explore as the legal changes with regard to same-sex marriage continue
to proliferate.
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